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It’s Not What You Expected!
The Surprising Nature of Cleft
Alternatives in French and English
Emilie Destruel 1*, David I. Beaver 2 and Elizabeth Coppock 3
1Department of French and Italian, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, United States, 2Department of Linguistics, University of
Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, United States, 3Department of Linguistics, Boston University, Boston, MA, United States
While much prior literature on the meaning of clefts—such as the English form “it
is X who Z-ed”—concentrates on the nature and status of the exhaustivity inference
(“nobody/nothing other than X Z”), we report on experiments examining the role of the
doxastic status of alternatives on the naturalness of c’est-clefts in French and it-clefts
in English. Specifically, we study the hypothesis that clefts indicate a conflict with a
doxastic commitment held by some discourse participant. Results from naturalness tasks
suggest that clefts are improved by a property we term “contrariness” (along the lines of
Zimmermann, 2008). This property has a gradient effect on felicity judgments: the more
strongly interlocutors appear committed to an apparently false notion, the better it is to
repudiate them with a cleft.
Keywords: English, French, clefts, contrast, interlocutors’ expectations, existential inference
1. INTRODUCTION
In many languages, a sentence expressing a single proposition can be cleft in twain, dividing the
message over two clauses. Two examples are the English it-cleft (1-a) and its French counterpart
the c’est-cleft (1-b).
(1) a. It’s [David]F who drank vodka.
b. C’est [David]F qui a bu de la vodka.
It is generally accepted that one purpose that clefting serves is to mark focus. Focus-marking entails
that there are alternatives relevant for interpretation, and that those alternatives correspond to the
focus-marked constituent (see e.g., Rooth, 1992; Krifka, 2008). In (1), the focus-marked constituent
is the so-called pivot of the cleft, corresponding to the subject of the embedded clause in this case,
and the alternatives correspond to other people who could have drank vodka, e.g., Paul, Jill, etc.
This paper investigates a relatively under-explored aspect of the focal alternatives determined by
a cleft, namely their doxastic status for the interlocutor. In particular, we investigate the possibility
that clefts signal a commitment on the part of the interlocutor to a proposition that conflicts with
the one the cleft expresses, and that clefts serve to express opposition to that commitment. Using
acceptability rating tasks, we provide experimental evidence that, ceteris paribus, both it-clefts
and c’est-clefts improve in acceptability in proportion to the degree to which they indicate that
an utterance runs contrary to a doxastic commitment on the part of the interlocutor (or another
discourse participant).
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Clefts have generally been analyzed as conveying three types
of information (Halvorsen, 1978; Horn, 1981; Lambrecht, 1994),
which we will refer to as the Halvorsen components. The first
is the at-issue content, often referred to as the PREJACENT,
which for a sentence of the form “it is X who Z-ed” is the
proposition expressed by the canonical form “X Z-ed” (2-a).
Second, clefts convey an EXISTENTIAL inference, such that there
exists an X who Z-ed (2-b). Unlike the prejacent, this aspect
of clefts is typically taken to be a presupposition. Third, they
convey an EXHAUSTIVE inference such that X is the sole (or
maximal) entity for which Z holds, e.g., (2-c)—the exact nature
of which is still a matter of debate (see among others, Halvorsen,
1978; Atlas and Levinson, 1981; Wedgewood, 2007; Velleman
et al., 2012; Büring and Kriz, 2013; Destruel et al., 2015). We
briefly note for concreteness that we simply assume clefts have
identical semantics as the prejacent, as argued for instance in
Horn (1981)1.
(2) a. Prejacent: David drank vodka.
b. Existential: Someone drank vodka.
c. Exhaustivity: No one other than David drank vodka.
The doxastic status of these or other inferences for the hearer
has typically not been discussed per se, although Prince (1978)
is one exception. On the basis of corpus evidence, she concluded
that although it-clefts mark the existential as a “known fact,” yet
“the information represented in it-cleft that-clauses does NOT
have to be assumed to be in the hearer’s mind.” Thus while the
existential inference is presupposed, it can be what she terms
an “informative presupposition.” She goes even further, claiming
that “it-clefts make no assumptions about the hearer.” This latter
claim is challenged by the data we present here.
Clefts have also been claimed to express contrast (Jespersen,
1927; Harries-Delisle, 1978; Sarnicola, 1988; Umbach, 2004;
Patten, 2012). For English, this observation dates back to the
work in which the term “cleft” was first coined; in perhaps the first
general treatment of clefts, Jespersen (1927) claims “A cleaving of
a sentence by means of it is (often followed by a relative pronoun
or connective) serves to single out one particular element of
the sentence and very often, by directing attention to it and
bringing it, as it were, into focus, to mark a contrast (Jespersen,
1927, 147f.). For French, a similar observation is found in the
seminal work of Lambrecht (1994), who argues that the c’est-
cleft is the most natural way to signal contrastive focus, a type of
focus that is sometimes distinguished from information focus (see
e.g., Zimmermann and Onea, 2011). The former signals contrast,
while the latter highlights new information.
1We further note that our assumptions about the truth-conditional semantics,
and indeed about the contrariness implications, are compatible with various
explanations given in the literature, which derive the existential and exhaustive
implications either by adding presuppositions or through a separate pragmatic
process, see for instance (Horn, 1981; Destruel, 2013). Specifically, the conclusions
we argue for with regard to contrariness are compatible with a QUD analysis as
proposed by e.g., Velleman et al. (2012), but the contrariness results show that
the constraints on the QUD would need to be strengthened to account for the
requirement that there is a salient contrary view on the correct answer to that
expressed by the prejacent.
How is contrast defined?On a broad view, adopted in the work
of Vallduvi and Vilkuna (1998) (see also Selkirk, 2008; Lopez,
2009; Katz and Selkirk, 2011), a kontrastive expression a generates
a membership set M = {..., a, ...} which “becomes available to
semantic computation as some sort of quantificational domain”
(Vallduvi and Vilkuna, 1998). Contrast (formalized as kontrast)
amounts to nothing more than membership in a salient set
on this understanding. We note that this definition of contrast
corresponds exactly to the definition of focus in Rooth (1985)’s
Alternative Semantics in that the contrastive element generates a
set of alternatives for the focused constituent.
Several more narrow conceptions of contrast exist as well.
Rooth (1992) defines contrast as a subcase of a more general
notion of focus; for him, a phrase α should be taken as contrasting
with a phrase β if the ordinary semantic value of β is an element
of the focus semantic value of α. É. Kiss (1998) writes that focus
(for which she uses the term “identificational” focus) has the
feature [+contrastive] “if it operates on a closed set of entities
whose members are known to the participants of the discourse
[. . . ]. In this case, the identification of a subset of the given set
also identifies the contrasting complementary subset” (p. 267).
This definition requires more than the broad one in that the set
of alternatives to the focal element must also be restricted in size,
and clearly identifiable by the discourse participants. Contrast has
also been characterizedwith a requirement to exclude alternatives
(Molnár, 2002; Kenesei, 2006); in other words, contrast entails
exhaustivity on this view. Both Rooth’s and Kiss’s conceptions
of contrast entail a requirement for a salient antecedent in the
discourse, a requirement that goes beyond the three Halvorsen
components ordinarily attributed to clefts.
There is some evidence that contrast in one of these narrower
conceptions is indeed encoded by clefts, as they do appear to
require a salient antecedent. For instance, while it-clefts often
sound odd as direct answers to overt questions as in (3)—i.e.,
when there is no antecedent in the discourse—they are often
much more natural as corrections, as in (4). In this case, the
previous utterance being corrected provides exactly the kind of
antecedent that Rooth mentions for a contrastive focus.
(3) A: Who cooked the beans?
B: #It was John who cooked the beans2.
(4) A: I wonder why Alex cooked so much beans.
B: Actually, it was John who cooked the beans.
Quantitative evidence that this contrast is robust comes from
Destruel and Velleman (2014), who find that the context in (3)
leads to the lowest naturalness ratings for clefts. If clefts encode
contrast in Rooth’s or Kiss’s sense, then these differences can
be explained3.
2Throughout the paper, we will indicate ungrammaticality with an asterisk (*) and
infelicity with a hash (#).
3For É. Kiss (1998), contrast is directly encoded in grammar and realized in
a specific sentence position, via clefting in English, and in the left periphery
in Hungarian. Put slightly differently, contrast is conventionally encoded in the
cleft structure itself. Other scholars, however, argue against the existence of
such a strong link, including Horn (1981) and Declerck (1984). On the basis
of experimental data in Georgian, Skopeteas and Fanselow (2010a) argue that
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But even if the three Halvorsen components introduced in (2)
are supplemented with a requirement for contrast in Rooth’s or
Kiss’s sense (i.e., a requirement for the right sort of antecedent),
the resulting theoretical picture still fails to capture certain facts
about cleft behavior. In English, in contexts where an appropriate
discourse-familiar alternative is indeed available, speakers may
nevertheless choose not to use a cleft—its use sounding stilted
and odd. Although experimental work on contrast in clefts is
scarce, in a study conducted by Destruel and Velleman (2014),
English speakers displayed a statistically robust preference for the
canonical version in (5). They also rated the sentence in (5-b) as
less natural than (6-b), despite the fact that (5-b) does have an
antecedent available (viz. Canada), and (6-b) does not4.
(5) A: Darren sounded really excited about his vacation. I
think he might be going to Canada.
a. B: Actually, he’s going to Mexico.
b. B: ? Actually, it’s Mexico that he’s going to.
(6) A: We were planning Amy’s surprise party for weeks.
I can’t believe she found out about it. Who told her
about it?
a. B: Ken told her about it.
b. B: It was Ken who told her about it.
Finally, it is worth noting that there is evidence that in certain
languages, clefts or other intuitive contrastive focus constructions
do not always lead to the exclusion of alternatives; the strength of
the exhaustive inference can in fact be modulated by the context.
This has been argued, for instance, for clefts in St’át’imcets
(Salish; Thoma, 2009) and French (Destruel and DeVeaugh-
Geiss, 2018), for focus movement structures in K’ichee’ which are
arguably clefts (Mayan; Yasavul, 2013), and for non-cleft focus
movement structures in Tangale (Chadic; Zimmermann, 2011)
which, Zimmerman argues, still show signs of being contrastive
in an important sense. Thus, if we want to retain the idea that
clefts (and other focus movement constructions) are inherently
contrastive, then these data suggest that defining contrast in
terms of exclusion of alternatives may also miss the mark.
Given this backdrop, the question arises as to whether another
factor might be relevant in better predicting the clefts’ use in
contrastive focus contexts, and more broadly, in characterizing
the notion of contrast. We think that an interesting approach
is found in Zimmermann (2008) and Zimmermann (2011),
who proposes a definition calling on the notion of speaker-
hearer expectation. This definition can therefore be thought of
as doxastic. A focus constituent α is contrastive whenever the
speaker assumes that “the hearer will not consider the content
of α or the speech act containing α likely to be(come) common
ground” (Zimmermann, 2008, 9). This suggestion is consonant
with an earlier claim of Delin (1991), based on an extensive
contrast-related movements are optional, providing evidence that foci realized in
the pre-verbal or post-verbal position can receive the same kinds of interpretations
(e.g., contrastive or exhaustive). This suggests that contrastivity is not directly
encoded in the grammar, at least in Georgian.
4Using a 5-point Likert scale, Destruel and Velleman (2014) found that the mean
ratings was 1.7 for (5-b), and 2.3 for (6-b).
corpus study, that one of several different functions of it-clefts
is “to correct some previous claim by challenging it.” Thus, our
first research question is the following:
(7) Research Question 1
What factor(s) other than the presence of a discourse-
familiar alternative licenses clefts, and, specifically, does
the attitude expressed toward salient alternatives affect the
felicity of clefts?
Our research on this question builds on previous work by
augmenting traditional analyses of contrast with what we
term contrariness. In the spirit of Zimmermann (2008) and
Zimmermann (2011), we take contrariness to relate to the
degree of commitment that an addressee is established to have
to a contrary focal alternative. More specifically, in our view,
contrariness has the following three properties: (a) contrast
(contrariness of one utterance in the discourse requires another
utterance such that the first is an element of the alternative set of
the second), (b) contradiction (taken together the two utterances
are inconsistent, i.e., they entail falsity), (c) strength or degree
of contrariness (which monotonically increases with the degree
of commitment of the speaker to inconsistent propositions
expressed by these utterances). We then distinguish between
three imaginable hypotheses:
(i) The meaning components identified by Halvorsen (1978)
(the Halvorsen components) are sufficient to capture the
significance of a cleft construction. The contribution of
alternatives to the meaning of a cleft lies solely in the
exhaustivity component of the meaning.
(ii) In addition to theHalvorsen components, clefts signal a non-
doxastic type of contrast, of the type characterized by É. Kiss
(1998) or Rooth (1992), incorporating a requirement for an
appropriate antecedent.
(iii) In addition to the Halvorsen components, clefts signal
a doxastic type of contrast (i.e., contrariness). The nature
of the clefted alternatives involves a contrast between
interlocutors’ expectations5.
The experiments reported in this paper set out to test Hypothesis
(iii)—we hypothesize that in addition to the core components in
(2), clefts incorporate a requirement that the ordinary meaning
is contrary to a previously salient focal alternative. Put slightly
differently, we expect clefts to be optimal candidates in contexts
where they do more than just introduce a linguistic contrast,
but rather are used as a response to an (explicit) contrary claim.
We expect this effect to be gradient on felicity judgments: the
more strongly interlocutors appear committed to an apparently
false notion, the better it is to repudiate them with a cleft.
Crucially, this doxastic definition allows for degrees of contrast,
corresponding to stronger or weaker conflict with expectations,
and we argue that these degrees correlate with clefts’ naturalness.
On this basis, the slight infelicity of (5-b) might be explained as
follows: Although there is some contrast between B’s claim and
5We discuss how our notion of contrariness relates to (accounts of) correctivity
in section 3.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 June 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 1400
Destruel et al. It’s Not What You Expected!
what A has stated previously, A’s hedging (“I think he might. . . ”)
indicates only a mild commitment to a contrary proposition,
and this mild commitment to a contrary proposition does not
suffice to make a cleft fully felicitous for B. Compare this with
the much more strident rebuttal of what the hearer suggests is
some people’s view found in this naturally occurring example
cited by Hedberg (1990)6:
(8) JM: Some people think that Reagan’s administration is at
its LOWEST ebb, its NADIR. Do you agree, Eleanor?
EC: Absolutely not. The Reagan-Baker Administration is
in FINE shape. It’s the BUCHANAN administration that’s
having PROBLEMS.
A second issue central to our current research concerns the
grammatical reflex of contrast across languages. Indeed, while the
bulk of the past theoretical literature on focus and clefts has been
developed around (introspective judgments for) English, cross-
linguistic counterparts to the it-cleft are also noted to express
contrast, such as the French c’est-cleft, as mentioned earlier.
But, as Repp (2016) notes, languages might differ with respect
to the grammatical sensitivity they have to particular aspects
of the (set of) alternatives. The author says that “for instance,
the view that alternativeness equals contrastiveness might make
the right prediction for the application of particular strategies
in language x whereas in language y similar marking strategies
might require the presence of a clearly identifiable alternative
set." This seems particularly relevant when comparing clefts in
languages like French and English since, while both it- and
c’est-clefts can express contrast, there are subtle and crucial
differences in their distribution. First, the French cleft is used
more commonly than its English counterpart (Carter-Thomas,
2009), in particular in comparison to canonical sentence forms
(SVO). The reason appears to be primarily prosodic: whereas
English can shift prosodic prominence to match the location of
the focus constituent, French is more rigid, and prosodic stress is
required to appear at the right edge of an intonation phrase. The
c’est-cleft, despite adding syntactic complexity, circumvents this
prosodic restriction by creating an extra intonational boundary
that can align with the focus constituent (Hamlaoui, 2008).
Consequently, the c’est-cleft constitutes the default strategy to
signal focus (also known as information focus), especially on
grammatical subjects (Lambrecht, 1994; Destruel, 2013; Féry,
2013). Second, the French c’est-cleft can be used in focus contexts
where the English cleft is prohibited; for instance to signal
focus on the entire sentence rather than on a single element
(i.e., broad focus). Given that clefts have a broader distribution
in French than English, our paper seeks to address a second
research question:
(9) Research Question 2
Does dependency of the status of alternatives differ
between these two languages?
6Note that we are simplifying in the current paper by only considering cases where
the speaker disagrees with the addressee, but a more general definition of contrast
would allow for disagreement with third parties.
Our research on the second question builds on prior work by
directly comparing the role of contrariness in two languages
that have different use-conditions for the cleft construction.
Given the subtle differences in clefts’ use in French and
English, we expect that the two languages may differ as to how
contrastive a discourse must be before the cleft is considered
most natural.
To the best of our knowledge, there have been very
few attempts to investigate the contrastive aspect of clefts
experimentally (but see Destruel and Velleman, 2014), and
especially across languages that differ in their use of clefting
as a strategy to mark focus. Moreover, in attempts that
do exist, contrast is not often operationalized in a gradient
way, i.e., studies typically compare highly contrastive contexts
to non-contrastive ones, leaving aside the potential different
degrees that contrast can have. Given these observations
and the background information presented thus far, this
paper aims to bridge the theoretical and the empirical
literature on contrast in clefts. The remainder of the paper
is structured as follows: We present the studies in section
2, discuss their results in light of current views of contrast
and correctivity, and clefts’ meaning in section 3. We end
with concluding remarks as well as avenues for future work
in section 4.
2. THE STUDIES
Recall that the paper examines two research questions, repeated
in (10) and (11) for convenience.
(10) Research Question 1
What factor(s) other than the presence of a discourse-
familiar alternative licenses clefts, and, specifically, does
the attitude expressed toward salient alternatives affect
the felicity of clefts?
(11) Research Question 2
Given that clefts have a broader distribution in French
than in English, does dependency of the status of
alternatives differ between these two languages?
Our investigation includes three tasks conducted in English
and French. Two pre-tests were designed to provide baseline
ratings for the existential inference in target sentences and
for the strength of commitment of Speaker A in the context,
respectively; the main task consisted of naturalness ratings for
clefts and canonical sentences in six contexts that instantiated
different degrees of contrariness. The experimental stimuli
for these three tasks were always presented in written form
and were based off of the same source sentences, which
were translated by a French native speaker for the French
version of the experiment. What differed across tasks regarding
the materials was which part of the stimuli participants
got to see and judge. Given this, we present the common
elements of the three tasks in section 2.1. We present the
details for each task—i.e., design, procedure and results—
in sections 2.2–2.4.
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2.1. Methods
2.1.1. Materials
The experimental stimuli consisted of short dialogues between
two speakers. All dialogues included a background (Speaker
A) as in (12), and a comment (Speaker B) presented either in
a canonical SVO or in a cleft form, as in (13). Note that the
sample stimuli in (12)–(13) illustrate the condition in which the
focus is on the grammatical subject. See (14) for an example
of the object condition, and Appendix A for a larger sample
of stimuli. The background always contained three sentences.
The first two established the story and the last one contained
the information on which B’s comment was based. The last
sentence in Speaker A’s part was crucial in our experiment; this
is the sentence we modulated to create six contexts with varying
degrees of contrariness, illustrated in (12-a)-(12-f). These six
contexts varied according to four factors: Grammatical Function,
Contradiction, Commitment and At-issueness. We detail them
individually hereafter. For each of the six contexts, we created
12 lexicalizations, so 72 experimental dialogues per grammatical
function or 144 in total, and this for each language.
(12) Speaker A: We were planning Amy’s surprise party for
weeks. I can’t believe she found out about it. [...]
a. Non-contradictory, At-issue (NO CONTR.)
... I guess someone from the staff told her.
b. Weak, At-issue (WEAK)
... I guess Alice must have told her.
c. Weak, Non-At-issue (WEAK NAI)
... And Alice—who I think, probably went and
told her about it—just laughed and said it was no
big deal!
d. Strong, At-issue (STRONG)
... Alice told her about it, you know.
e. Strong, Non-At-issue (STRONG NAI)
... And Alice—who went and told her about it—just
laughed and said it was no big deal!
f. Strong Presuppositional, Non-At-Issue (STRONG
PRE.)
... I’m annoyed that Alice told her about it!
(13) Speaker B: Yeah/ Actually, [...]
a. ... Ken told her about it. (canonical form)
b. ... it’s Ken who told her about it. (cleft form)
The first factor varied was GRAMMATICAL FUNCTION of the
focused element, that is whether the element that B commented
on was the grammatical subject or the object. Example (14)
illustrates the object condition for context NO CONTR.
(14) Object condition, NO CONTR.:
a. Speaker A: Look at John this evening! He’s all
dressed up. [...] I guess he’s going out with someone
from the marketing team.
b. Speaker B: Yeah, he’s going out with Karen/ Yeah,
it’s Karen he’s going out with.
The second factor, CONTRADICTION, refers to whether or
not the information in Speaker B’s comment contradicted the
information stated in the last sentence uttered by Speaker A.
We can think of this variable as binary: The first context we
designed (NO CONTR.) has a contradiction value of 0 (i.e., it is
non-contradictory) because there is no other identifiable salient
individual in A’s part. The other five contexts have a contradiction
value equal to 1; they are contradictory in the sense that there
is one alternative explicitly given in the discourse, thus being
clearly identified. In the non-contradictory context, B’s comment
was always introduced by “Yeah/Ouai,...,” while in all others, B’s
comment was introduced by “Actually/En fait,...”.
The third factor we manipulated was AT-ISSUENESS, which
refers to whether or not the relevant proposition in A’s speech
commented on by B was at-issue. The motivation behind
including AT-ISSUENESS as a factor comes from Destruel and
Velleman (2014), who also argue for the relevance of contrast
in expectation in the interpretation of clefts, and propose that
two types of expectations may be at play; not just expectations
about the state of the world but also expectations about the shape
and direction of discourse. The latter type is directly relevant
here since it may involve beliefs about the direction in which
the discourse is going, expressed, among other ways, by marking
content as at-issue or not-at-issue. We assume that interlocutors
taking part in a discourse will generally address the propositions
that are currently at-issue.
Finally, we varied COMMITMENT, which corresponds to
the strength with which Speaker A is committed to their
statement. Expanding on prior studies on the (grammatical)
reflexes of contrast, we take this factor to be gradient; it can
vary in strength depending on how the speaker chooses to
express their beliefs. We designed contexts that varied in ways
that we assumed would affect the level of commitment7. We
used a variety of attitude verbs and adverbs to encode these
various degrees. For instance, in the weak and strong conditions
(contexts WEAK to STRONG NAI), the speaker respectively
expresses a low or a high degree of commitment toward the
asserted prejacent proposition. In context STRONG PRE., on the
contrary, the prejacent is presupposed; the speaker expresses a
personal, subjective opinion about the truth of another asserted
proposition in the sentence (i.e., “I’m annoyed that Alice told
her about it!,” in (12-f)). Since at-issueness reflects differences
in whether a speaker has decided to foreground commitment to
a proposition, we anticipated that at-issueness might affect the
perceived level of commitment. Further, different types of non-
at-issue material (conventional implicatures vs. presuppositions)
might also be expected to affect perceived commitment in
different ways, e.g., because presupposed non-at-issue material
is often taken to reflect a shared commitment, whereas other
types of non-at-issue material, such as conventional implicatures
from parenthetical, are not. Therefore we included both stimuli
in which the target proposition was presupposed, and material
in which it was conventionally implicated (in the sense
of Potts, 2005).
7A reviewer asks why subjects should attribute a stronger commitment to A toward
the proposition in context WEAK than in context NO CONTR.. We believe they
should because in context 2, speaker A attributes a particular value, that is identifies
a specific referent, that is then contradicted by B.
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A pre-test (task 2), which we detail in section 2.3 was
conducted prior to the main task in order to assess whether
our contexts were indeed different with respect to the strength
of COMMITMENT encoded, as we conceived them to be. In our
view, more strongly expressed commitment lead to stronger
conflict between interlocutors, and thus we hypothesized that
clefts are more natural in cases when the level of conflict between
interlocutors is maximal, or in other words, when clefts are used
as responses to an (explicit) contrary claim.
We now turn to discussing each task individually, the
two pre-tests first (sections 2.2 and 2.3) and then the main
task (section 2.4).
2.2. Task 1: Strength of Existential
Inference
2.2.1. Participants
We note that all participants in Task 1 were different from the
participants who completed Task 2 and the main task.
For English: We recruited a total of 65 participants (all
undergraduates at a midwestern university, ages: 19–23; median:
20) from a first-year language class. Subjects were given extra-
credit for their participation and were all naive as to the goal of
the experiment.
For French: We recruited 48 monolingual native speakers
of French. All were given monetary compensation for their
participation and were naive as to the goal of the experiment.
Participants were from the regions of Pau, Toulouse and Albi in
Southwestern France. Overall, 61% were undergraduate students,
34% graduate students, and 5% staff working at the university.
2.2.2. Design & Procedure
The goal of this first test was to measure the strength of the
existential inference in Speaker A’s part, i.e., how likely is it that
A believes someone “Z-ed”? This is necessary to ensure that any
effect of contrariness we find is not an artifact of variation among
items with respect to the strength of the existential inference
that they give rise to. The test was delivered via the web-based
survey site Qualtrics. Participants sat in front of a computer
screen and read a total of 24 backgrounds (A’s part), pseudo-
randomized among 24 fillers (recall that participants only saw
and rated Speaker A’s part of the dialogue in this task.) On each
trial, after reading A’s part, participants were asked to judge, on
a scale from 1 to 7, how likely is it that A thinks that someone
Z-ed. So for instance, given NO CONTR. context in (12-a) above,
participants were asked how likely is it that “A believes someone
told Amy about her surprise party” (1 corresponding to extremely
unlikely and 7 to extremely likely). The procedure for English and
French was exactly similar; French speakers provided judgments
based on the question “Quelle est la probabilité que A pense que
quelqu’un a Z?”
2.2.3. Results
Mean probability ratings for the strength of the existential
inference in A’s part are presented in Table 1, for English
and French.
Visual inspection of these averages suggests that participants
deem the likelihood of speaker thinking that someone Z-ed lower
TABLE 1 | Mean probability judgments for pre-test 1 (Strength of
existential inference).
Mean ratings
(subjects)
Mean ratings
(objects)
Overall
ratings
English French English French English French
No contr. 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.8 4.5 4.65
Weak 6.5 6.3 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.35
Weak nai 6.5 6.4 6.5 6.4 6.5 6.4
Strong 6.6 6.4 6.7 6.6 6.7 6.5
Strong nai 6.4 6.8 6.4 6.6 6.4 6.7
Strong pre. 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.8 6.7 6.75
for the context that lacks a contrast between A’s sentence and
B’s response (i.e., context NO CONTR., µ = 4.5/4.65), vs. other
contexts (where µ is consistently above 6.3)—and this quite
similarly in both languages.
To determine whether participants’ existential ratings varied
depending on the fixed-effect predictor CONTRAST (sum-coded
prior to analysis as -1/1 for context (NO CONTR. vs. others,
respectively), we fit a linear mixed effect model to the data
for each language. The two models included the maximal
random effects structure justified by the data: random by-item
intercepts, random by-participant intercepts and random slopes
for CONTRAST by item and participant. P-values were obtained
by likelihood ratio test of the full model with the effect in question
against the model without the effect in question. Results reveal
a significant effect of CONTRAST both in English (β = 2.043,
SE = 0.091, t = 22.24, p < .001), and French (β = 1.62, SE =
0.24, t = 6.72, p < .001) suggesting that, as expected, there was
a difference in ratings between the non-contrastive context (#1,
in (12-a)) vs. the others where a conjecture was present [contexts
in (12-b)–(12-f)].
Crucially though, when looking only at the contradictory
contexts, we see that the ratings do not significantly differ from
each other with respect to A’s commitment to existence. This is
an important finding since it indicates homogeneity across these
contexts. If we also find that these contexts differ in the strength
of A’s commitment to a statement that B will contradict (as they
were designed to do and is tested in task 2), then we will be able
to test our prediction that clefts’ naturalness is best predicted by
a doxastic contrast (i.e., Hypothesis iii.).
2.3. Task 2: Strength of Commitment
2.3.1. Participants
We note that all participants in Task 2 were different from the
participants who completed Task 1 and the main task.
For English: We recruited a total of 65 participants (all
undergraduates at a midwestern university, ages: 18–21; median:
20) from a first-year language class. Subjects were given extra-
credit for their participation and were all naive as to the goal of
the experiment.
For French: We recruited 48 monolingual native speakers
of French. All were given monetary compensation for their
participation and were naive as to the goal of the experiment.
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Participants were from the regions of Pau, Toulouse and Albi in
Southwestern France. Overall, 83% were undergraduate students,
15% graduate students, and 2% staff working at the university.
2.3.2. Design & Procedure
Recall that the different contexts in our study were designed
to reflect the idea that contrast is not simply a binary notion,
but rather that speakers’ beliefs are gradient. We created four
levels—non-contradictory, weak, strong and presuppositional—
with the underlying assumption being that commitment would
get increasingly stronger across these levels. The present task
was conducted to test precisely this assumption, that is to
directly measure how strongly is A committed to “X Z-ed.”
Thus, subjects who took part in this task only saw and rated
Speaker A’s part of the dialogue. The test was delivered via the
web-based survey site Qualtrics. Participants sat in front of a
computer screen and read a total of 24 contexts (A’s part) pseudo-
randomized among 24 fillers. On each trial, after reading A’s
context, they were asked to judge, on a scale from 1 to 7, how
strongly is A committed to the fact that X Z-ed. So for instance,
given context NO CONTR. in (12-a) above, participants were
asked how strongly is Speaker A committed to the fact that
“someone from the staff told Amy about her surprise party” (with
1 corresponding to extremely uncommitted and 7 to extremely
committed). Here again, the procedure for English and French
was exactly similar; French speakers provided judgments based
on the question “À quel point est-ce que A pense que X a Z?”
2.3.3. Results
Results for both languages are reported in Table 2. Looking
at the ratings descriptively, we indeed observe a strengthening
trend across contexts. We see that context NO CONTR. is
given the lowest commitment scores of all contexts, and that
contexts STRONG, STRONG NAI and STRONG PRE.—which were
designed to contain a stronger commitment of A to the prejacent
proposition—are indeed being rated higher than contexts WEAK
and WEAK NAI, which were meant to weakly commit A to the
prejacent. Interestingly, we do not see a major difference between
the strong and the presuppositional context.
Statistically, we fit a linear mixed effect model to the data
for each language to determine whether participants’ judgments
varied depending on the fixed-effect predictor COMMITMENT.
We were most interested in the following comparisons:
TABLE 2 | Mean commitment judgments for pre-test 2.
Mean ratings
(subjects)
Mean ratings
(objects)
Overall ratings
English French English French English French
No contr. 2.2 2.3 2 2.1 2.1 2.2
Weak 3.6 3.8 3.9 4.1 3.8 4
Weak nai 2.7 3 2.6 3.5 2.7 3.2
Strong 6.1 6.4 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.25
Strong nai 5.5 5.8 5.3 5.8 5.4 5.8
Strong pre. 5.3 6 5.6 6.2 5.5 6.1
comparing the context with no contradiction (NO CONTR.)
to context with weak at-issue commitment (WEAK context),
and comparing weak contexts (WEAK and WEAK NAI) to
strong contexts (STRONG and STRONG NAI). We used sum-
coding prior to analysis (i.e., -1/1) for each level in each
comparison. The models included the maximal random effects
structure justified by the data: random by-item intercepts,
random by-participant intercepts and random slopes for
COMMITMENT by item and participant. P-values were obtained
by likelihood ratio test of the full model with the effect in question
against the model without the effect in question. Concentrating
on the comparison between our NO CONTR. and WEAK contexts,
we found a significant effect of COMMITMENT both in English
(β = 1.54, SE = 0.017, t = 3.31, p < .001), and French (β =
1.47, SE = 0.11, t = 3.56, p < .001). We also found a significant
effect of COMMITMENT when comparing weak contexts to strong
ones, both in English (β = 2.29, SE = 0.29, t = 5.24, p < .001),
and French (β = 2.11, SE = 0.025, t = 4.98, p < .001). Overall,
these results are welcome since they suggest that the contexts
we designed did differ in the strength of A’s commitment to
a statement that B will contradict to the prejacent, and this
for both languages. We can now turn to the main task, testing
Hypothesis (iii).
2.4. Main Task
2.4.1. Participants
We note that all participants in the main task were different from
the participants who completed Task 1 and the Task 2.
For English: We recruited 64 participants on Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk with U.S. IP addresses (ages: 20–61; median:
36). They were paid $1 for their participation. Subjects who did
not self-identify as native English speakers were not considered.
For French: We recruited 48 monolingual native speakers
of French. All were given monetary compensation for their
participation and were naive as to the goal of the experiment.
Participants were from the regions of Pau, Toulouse and Albi in
Southwestern France. Overall, 77% were undergraduate students,
17% graduate students, and 6% staff working at the university.
2.4.2. Design & Procedure
On each trial of this task, participants saw the whole dialogue,
that is, A’s background followed by Speaker B’s comment
(appearing either in cleft or canonical form). They were asked
to judge the naturalness of B’s sentence given A’s on a seven-point
Likert scale, with 1 corresponding to extremely unnatural and 7
to extremely natural.
We tested the effect of four factors on participants’ ratings of
cleft and canonical sentences: (i) EXISTENCE (based on measures
collected in task 1), (ii) GRAMMATICAL FUNCTION (subject
vs. object), (iii) AT-ISSUENESS, and (iv) CONTRARINESS. The
factor CONTRARINESS was operationalized as the product of
contradiction and strength of commitment (Contrariness =
Contradiction ∗ Strength of Commitment). Contradiction, as
mentioned in section 2.1.1, is either equal to 0 in the non-
contradictory context (context NO CONTR. where Speaker B
does not say anything that conflicts with what Speaker A says)
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or equal to 1 in the others. Consequently, items in the non-
contradictory context had a contrariness value of 0. Items in
contradictory contexts (contexts WEAK to STRONG PRE.) had a
contrariness value equal to 1 (their contradiction value) * the
value of Speaker A’s commitment to the conflicting proposition,
as measured in task 2.
If the data supports Hypothesis (iii), we expect to find that
clefts are rated as more natural in the contexts where the level
of contrariness is higher. We counterbalanced the experimental
dialogues across 12 lists so that each participant judged a total
24 items (12 subjects and 12 objects). The order of the items was
pseudo-randomized among 24 fillers.
2.4.3. Results
In the following, we begin by assessing our results descriptively,
then we turn to the statistical analyses. Results combined for
both sentence forms (clefts and SVO canonical sentences) and
collapsed for grammatical function (subjects and objects) are
illustrated in Figure 1, for English on the left panel and French
on right panel. On Figure 1, red-colored markers represent clefts
and black-colored markers represent canonical sentences. The
cross-shaped markers on the y-axis indicate the naturalness
ratings in the non-contradictory context (NO CONTR.). The
circle-shaped markers indicate the ratings for the other contexts.
Moreover, we note that the labels on the x-axis do not correspond
to the number of our contexts, bur rather encode the contrariness
values attributed to items in these contexts on a 7-point Likert
scale, as per the results we gained in task 2 (discussed in
section 2.3). Put simply, our x-axis represents the product of
CONTRADICTION and COMMITMENT (as measured in task 2).
Tables that include the mean naturalness ratings for each of
our six contexts, per language and sentence form, can be found
in Appendix B.
Inspecting the data for English, the figure reveals that the
ratings for the cleft seem the most affected by CONTRARINESS,
displaying the steepest increase across language and conditions
(as illustrated by the upward trend in the position of the red dots).
Indeed, clefts’ ratings were the lowest of all in the NO CONTRNO
CONTR. context (µ = 3.39), but increased as CONTRARINESS
intensified (µ = 5.9 in STRONG PRE. context). The picture is
quite different for canonical sentences: They were rated as very
natural in the non-contradictory context (µ = 6.25), which
should come to no surprise since in English, canonical sentences
constitute an unmarked sentence form and are commonly used
to answer an explicit wh-question. Interestingly, their felicity
did not improve much with CONTRARINESS, but in fact slightly
decreased (µ = 5.6). Despite this decrease though, canonical
sentences were never judged infelicitous (in the sense of being
below the midpoint of the 7 point scale), and were only slightly
worse than clefts in the STRONG PRE. context.
Turning to French, we also observe an increase in clefts’
naturalness as CONTRARINESS gets stronger, but to a much lower
degree than in English. This is mainly due to the fact that French
clefts are already rated fairly high in NO CONTR. context (µ
= 4.56), as opposed to the English clefts (µ = 3.39), which is
expected given that clefts are the most natural way to signal focus
in the former language, especially with grammatical subjects
(as argued by Lambrecht, 1994 among others, and empirically
substantiated in Destruel, 2013; Féry, 2013). Similarly to English
though, canonical sentences behave differently from clefts: While
being rated highly in non-contradictory contexts (µ = 5.64), their
naturalness does not improve as the level of CONTRARINESS rises
(µ = 5.03). The first part of this result is interesting because
it is at odds with many past accounts in the French literature
that claim canonical sentences are highly disprefered in focus
contexts (Lambrecht, 1994; Katz, 1997; Doetjes et al., 2004).What
could be happening is that canonical sentences are rated as more
felicitous in our study because they appear in written form, rather
than in colloquial speech. We return to this point in the general
discussion in section 3.
Now, we explore the data by grammatical function (subjects
vs. objects), as illustrated in Figure 2, where ratings for canonical
sentences appearing in the left panels and ratings for clefts appear
in the right panels. The data for English are on the top two
graphs; the data for French are at the bottom. On all plots,
the red-colored markers represent the subject condition and
black-colored markers represent the object condition. The cross-
shaped markers represent the data for the non-contradictory
context, and the circle-shaped markers represent the data for the
contradictory contexts.
First, we concentrate on the right panels—the results for cleft
sentences. Visual inspection of Figure 2 reveals an asymmetry
in clefts’ ratings for French in the non-contradictory context
(bottom right graph): Object clefts (black circles) appear clearly
lower than subject clefts (red circles) (µ = 3.68 vs. µ = 5.43,
respectively). This asymmetry relating to argument hierarchy is
in line with the past literature and recent empirical evidence
that suggest subject focus obligatorily induces a non-canonical
structure while object focus only optionally does so since objects
appear by default rightward, where prominence is assigned in
French (Lambrecht, 2001; Destruel, 2016). We note that evidence
for such an asymmetry is also provided cross-linguistically
in languages such as Spanish (Buring and Gutierrez-Bravo,
2001), Northern Sotho (Zerbian, 2007), Georgian and Hungarian
(Skopeteas and Fanselow, 2010b). This asymmetry is absent from
our English data (see top right graph, µ = 3.26 and µ = 3.52
for objects vs. subjects, respectively), which is in line with the
English results from an elicitation task reported in Skopeteas and
Fanselow (2010b).
Second, looking at the data for canonical sentences, we see
no such asymmetry in either of the two languages. Canonical
sentences are rated equally high whether focus appears on the
subject or the object, especially in the NO CONTR. context
(English: µ = 6.3 for subjects and µ = 6.2 for objects;
French: µ = 5.8 for subjects and µ = 6 for objects). Here
as well, we note that the results for French are at odds with
Lambrecht’s claim that canonical sentences with lexical subjects
is not the predominant pattern that surfaces in the spoken
language (Lambrecht, 1987).
We conclude by reporting on the statistical analyses. We
conducted mixed-effects linear regressions predicting clefts and
canonical sentences’ naturalness ratings in English and French
from fixed effects of interest (i.e., grammatical function, at-
issueness, existence and contrariness), and the following random-
effect structure: random intercepts and slopes for the fixed
effects of interest, and their interaction when relevant, per
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 June 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 1400
Destruel et al. It’s Not What You Expected!
FIGURE 1 | Naturalness ratings for English (Left) and French (Right).
FIGURE 2 | Naturalness ratings per grammatical function, for canonical sentences (Left) and clefts (Right) in English (Top) and French (Bottom).
participant and item. When the maximal models did not
converge with the maximal random effects structure, they
were re-conducted with the next maximal random effects
structure until convergence was achieved. All fixed effects
were centered before entering the analysis. To assess whether
inclusion of a given factor significantly improved the fit of
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the overall model, likelihood-ratio tests were performed that
compared two minimally different models, one with the fixed
effects factor in question and one without, while keeping the
random effects structure identical (Barr et al., 2013). The
full model had the following structure: (Ratings ∼ 1 + At-
Iss * GramFunct * Exist * Contrariness + Maximal RES).
In the following, we report on estimates, standard errors,
and t-values for all models (with any t-value exceeding 1.96
considered statistically significant with p < 0.05), as well as the
χ2 and P-values from the likelihood-ratio tests. Results were
obtained using the lmer function of the lme4 package (GPL-
2|GPL-3, v.1.1-13; Bates et al., 2015) in the R environment
(GPL-2|GPL-3, v.3.3.3; R Core Team, 2017).
We split the data prior to analysis, first looking at ratings
for clefts in English. Within this data set, we found no effect of
AT-ISSUENESS (β = -0.16, SE = 0.11, t = -1.44), suggesting that
when clefts were used to signal an unexpected discourse move
(i.e., to signal contrast on an element that was part of the non-
at-issue content of A’s speech) they were not drastically better
than when commenting on an at-issue part of discourse. There
was also no effect of GRAMMATICAL FUNCTION (β = 0.31, SE =
0.09, t = 1.13), such that the ratings for subject and object clefts
were not significantly different. There was, however, an effect of
EXISTENCE (β = 0.52, SE = 0.08, t = 6.55), suggesting that clefts
were rated significantly better in contexts where the existence
of the element to be contrasted is assumed. Of the three nested
models, the one that gave the best fit to the data was the model
that simply included the factor EXISTENCE (χ2 = 9.72, p< 0.01).
Of most interest to us, the factor that had the largest effect on
clefts’ ratings was CONTRARINESS (β = 0.01, SE = 0.001, t =
11.06)—the model that included this factor gave a significantly
better fit to the data compared to the model that did not (χ2 =
77.85, p < 0.01). This supports our hypothesis (Hypothesis iii)
that clefts’ naturalness is affected by the degree to which a speaker
is committed to a (false) claim.
The picture is similar for French clefts in that AT-ISSUENESS
had no effect either (β = -0.01, SE = 0.08, t = -1.34),
but EXISTENCE did (β = 0.64, SE = 0.05, t = 12.03). One
notable difference is that there was an effect of GRAMMATICAL
FUNCTION (β = 0.88, SE = 0.07, t = 11.84), suggesting that subject
clefts were given significantly better ratings than objects clefts.
This result is unsurprising given what we already mentioned;
that clefts are argued to be the default strategy to signal subject
focus in French. The factor CONTRARINESS, although to a lesser
extent than in English, also had a significant effect in predicting
clefts’ naturalness (β = 0.008, SE = 0.001, t = 5.55); a model that
included this factor gave a better fit to the data than a model
without it (χ2 = 41.18, p< 0.01).
Finally, we report on the naturalness rating for the data set
of ratings for canonical sentences. In English, we only found an
effect of CONTRARINESS (β = -0.092, SE = 0.017, t = -5.24); all
other factors did not significantly affect the felicity of canonical
sentences. In French, we found no effect of AT-ISSUENESS (β =
0.11, SE = 0.10, t = 1.06) or of EXISTENCE (β = 0.09, SE = 0.08, t
= 1.02), but there were an effect of GRAMMATICAL FUNCTION (β
= -0.20, SE = 0.09, t = -2.25) and of CONTRARINESS (β = -0.007,
SE = 0.001, t = -4.92).
3. GENERAL DISCUSSION
Clefts have long been noted to be focus-marking devices, often
expressing a more special type of focus, i.e., contrastive focus,
as opposed to a “simpler” type of focus generally referred
to as informational focus (É. Kiss, 1998). Yet, traditional
definitions of contrast appear unable to fully predict when these
structures are most felicitous. This observation constituted the
core motivation for our studies—our goal being to explore the
relationship between the rhetorical role of focal alternatives
and the naturalness of clefts in French and English, as per the
two research questions in (10) and (11). More specifically, the
experiments were designed to test the idea that clefts incorporate
a requirement that the ordinary meaning is contrary to a
previously salient focal alternative, which we operationalized
via the notion of contrariness (i.e., strength of commitment
* contradiction).
In the following, we first summarize the main experimental
results and how they speak to our research questions, then we
turn to discussing the implications of our findings for accounts
on the meaning of clefts, definitions of contrast, and theories
of focus.
Regarding the first research question, the experiment provided
evidence that, although the presence of a focal alternative in
the discourse context does increase the naturalness of clefts,
it does not suffice to explain when clefts are preferred. In
fact, while controlling for other factors known to influence
the acceptability of clefts, naturalness ratings were significantly
impacted when a doxastic contrast was involved: clefts are better
in contexts where they indicate that an utterance runs contrary
to a doxastic commitment held by the hearer, and the results are
consistent with there being a requirement for a salient contrary
doxastic commitment, whether that of an addressee or some
other individual. We also found that whether contrastive content
was marked as being at-issue or not did not significantly affect
clefts’ naturalness. This suggests that metalinguistic expectations
about how a contrary point of view is changing in the discourse
are less relevant to the acceptability of clefts than are salient
beliefs about the world.
Our second research question asked whether dependency on
the status of alternatives differs between French and English. In
considering this question, it is necessary first to tease apart what
we take to be independent differences between the two languages.
Specifically, we need to separate the effects of grammatical
function from the effects of the status of alternatives. Our
experiments showed, in agreement with past literature, that
in French but not English there is an effect of grammatical
function: whereas in French subjects are more naturally clefted
than objects, this is not the case for English. Our statistical
analysis shows that once we control for this cross-cutting factor,
we can see that clefts in the two languages exhibit very similar
dependencies on the status of alternatives. In both languages
clefts are more natural when there is doxastic contrast.
Even though our study was designed primarily to examine
the use of clefts, another way to look at the data is to examine
what happens in comparison with canonical sentences. It is
often thought that their use is correlated: Lambrecht (1994) has
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claimed that clefts in French are used when canonical sentences
are infelicitous. We find qualified support for this hypothesis,
and indeed the effects are found in both languages we studied.
On the one hand, canonical sentences were never rated as being
highly infelicitous in our study. This fact appears to partially
undercut Lambrecht’s claim, since he motivated it on the basis
of judgment and observational data suggesting that canonical
sentences in French with lexical (i.e., non-pronominal) subjects
are infelicitous. To the extent that we can operationalize infelicity
as corresponding to mean ratings in the lower half of our 7 point
scale, this is not what we found. While the results on clefts in
non-contrastive conditions showed that the French speakers in
our sample were prepared to mark at least some sentence types as
being infelicitous in some conditions, they never rated canonical
sentences as infelicitous. Thus, if French speakers only used clefts
when their canonical counterparts were strictly infelicitous, they
would be predicted to never use clefts at all, or at least not
in any of the conditions we tested. Nonetheless, we did find
reduced acceptability for canonical sentences in some conditions,
specifically for sentences in French in which the context might
lead to an expectation of focus on the subject, and for canonical
sentences in both French and English for which the context led to
a high level of contrariness. It is precisely in these conditions that
cleft sentences have their highest mean acceptability in our study.
Hence there is, at the very least, a correlation: the less acceptable
canonical sentences are in a given context, the more acceptable
corresponding cleft sentences are in that same context. It is thus
plausible that at least one of the factors motivating cleft use is
dispreference for use of the canonical form, albeit that it would
be far too strong to say that cleft sentences are used when the
canonical counterpart is unavailable.
What are we to make of the fact that canonical sentences
in both French and English were judged to be slightly, but
significantly degraded in contexts imposing a high degree of
contrariness? One hypothesis consistent with this result is
that the grammar directly imposes a penalty on the use of
canonical sentences in such contexts. However, here, the style
of Lambrecht’s analysis provides an alternative way to look at
the data. Lambrecht’s model is paradigmatic, i.e., based on the
contention that language users consider competing forms, and
that suitability of one form depends on the availability and
appropriateness of competing forms. It is consistent with the
data that while the canonical form is unmarked, and has no
requirements on (non-)contrariness, the cleft construction is a
marked form which is specifically used when the meaning is
also marked, for example in terms of contrariness. Thus in these
situations, following what Horn (1984) called the division of
pragmatic labor, the marked form is expected to be used in the
marked context, and the unmarked form is then pragmatically
dispreferred in these contexts. This type of explanation of the
observed degradedness of canonical sentences in some contexts
provides broad support for a Lambrechtian approach, even if
his specific claims appear overly strong. Of course, it is also
compatible with our data that cleft sentences are unmarked, and
involve no inherent, conventionalized contrariness preference,
but that canonical sentences have a conventional preference for
non-contrary contexts. This seems a prima facie implausible
analysis, reflected in the fact that the linguistic convention of
terming the SVO form in English and French “canonical” already
suggests that it is the unmarked form. We merely note that our
data does not mitigate strongly against such an analysis.
As discussed in the introduction, the past literature on the
meaning of clefts has largely characterized clefts as having three
meaning components, cited in (2). Furthermore, much work has
concentrated on describing the nature of exhaustivity, arguing
either that it is semantically encoded in the cleft itself (Atlas and
Levinson, 1981; Percus, 1997; É. Kiss, 1998; Hedberg, 2013), or
that it arises as a result of pragmatic reasoning on the discourse
context (Horn, 1981). In general, it is often supposed that aspects
of meaning which are “baked” into the conventional meaning
of an expression should surface more robustly than aspects
of meaning and use which are derived indirectly, and involve
pragmatic reasoning. Based on this premise, prior experimental
research (Byram-Washburn et al., 2013; Destruel, 2013) has
suggested that exhaustivity is pragmatic. The pattern of data that
we have reported on in the current paper might then also be
taken to suggest that contrariness requirements are derived via
some pragmatic process, since, our contrariness data resemble
prior exhaustivity data in that we observed gradient differences in
judgments across conditions, rather than clear categorical effects
with sharp boundaries between felicitous and infelicitous uses of
clefts. However, we must note here that absent more constraints
on possible conventional theories and the way they relate to
judgment data, such a conclusion would be premature.
To see how our data might in principle be modeled in terms
of linguistic conventions, let us briefly describe one such model.
Call a base grammar one in which there is a certain set of
requirements on the epistemic attitude of a salient individual
toward a contrary proposition to the cleft. For example, this
might be a null requirement, with no contrariness needed at all,
it might be the requirement that a salient individual thinks the
contrary proposition is possible, or it might be the requirement
that a salient individual is certain of the contrary proposition.
Now suppose that our experimental subjects are uncertain as
to the exact meaning of a cleft, each entertaining a mixture of
base grammars as possible models of the meaning of a cleft,
and attributing different probabilities to each base grammar.
Imagine that a person—for whom each base grammar Gi is
assigned a non-trivial probabilities pi—is faced with an example
which is grammatical according to grammars G1, ...,Gr , and
ungrammatical according to grammars Gr+1...Gn. Let us suppose
that their judgment of the grammaticality will be proportional
to 6r1pi. That is, we suppose that felicity of an example is
proportional to the likelihood of the grammar being one which
accepts that example. In that case, the more contrary the context
for an example, the more positive will be the predicted felicity
judgment, since a more contrary case is bound to satisfy strictly
more grammars. Further, the model would allow variation
across experimental subjects to be modeled in terms of them
having different base grammar probability distributions. Such a
model could account for our gradient data entirely in terms of
conventionally stipulated, categorical contrariness requirements
of clefts. Thus, while we make no claim to have resolved whether
contrariness is pragmatic (in which case an explanation of the
phenomenon would still be needed), or based on a conventional
requirement for contrariness, what we can say is that accounts
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of the meaning of clefts which are restricted to only the three
standard components of cleft meaning are insufficient, since
these do not account for our data.
Our research also relates to discussions on the definition
of contrast concerned with how to characterize the nature of
the alternatives in the interpretation of contrastive focus (as
opposed to plain focus, or “informational” focus following É.
Kiss, 1998). As discussed in the introduction, the past literature
has often identified three relevant ingredients to contrast, namely
the size of the alternative set, the identifiability of its elements,
and the exclusion requirement of the alternatives. Our study
speaks to the role of these aspects in that our experimental design
included a non-contrastive context, in which these aspects
were absent (i.e., an alternative to the focused element was not
explicitly mentioned, and therefore what was said about the
contrastively focused element potentially held of its alternatives),
and contrastive contexts, in which the size of the alternative
set was restricted to one alternative, explicitly mentioned (thus
identifiable), and for which the predicate did not hold. Although
we found that clefts’ naturalness ratings were significantly better
in the latter contexts for both languages, French clefts were rated
fairly high in the non-contrastive context. This suggests that the
presence of a clearly identifiable alternative (set) is not required
in this language—the pivot position does not seem influenced by
the alternative type, while it is in English. Thus, the grammatical
sensitivity to this particular aspect of contrast differs between
French and English.
Our main finding, though, suggests that characterizing
contrast solely in terms of contrast set size, element identifiability
and the exclusion requirement is insufficient. We have shown
that the notion of contrariness is also important and indeed
better explains clefts’ use-conditions, both in French and English.
This is where we would like to relate our finding to an idea
present in Repp (2016): To gain a precise understanding of the
notion of contrast, one should not only consider the way in
which alternatives are construed, but also the type of context
in which two sentences or discourse segments appear. Put
slightly differently, Repp claims that while the alternativeness of
constituents has to do with the explicitness (or lack there of) of
the alternative (set), another important element of contrast has
to do with the type of discourse relation in which sentences are
involved. While the basic ingredients of contrast are that there
must be similarities and dissimilarities between two sentences,
Repp also discusses the fact that additional aspects can come
into play—e.g., a violation of expectation—that lead to having
a different discourse relation between two segments d1 and d2.
Repp hypothesizes that three relations are most relevant to the
notion of contrast, which she calls NON-CONTRASTIVE, OPPOSE
and CORRECTION relations. Crucially, she argues that these three
discourse relations correspond to increasingly stronger degrees of
contrast, which stems from the idea that contrast should indeed
be considered a gradable phenomenon (an idea already present
in some prior work such as Molnár, 2006). For instance, Repp
argues that two segments in a CORRECTION relation express
contrast more strongly than two segments that stand in an
OPPOSE relation. The core difference between the three relations
lies in the type of contribution that d1 and d2 make to the
discourse: while d1 and d2 cannot be simultaneously true in an
correction relation but can in a non-contrastive one, while they
make opposing contribution in an oppose relation.
How do these discourse relations relate to the present work?
In our experiment, given Repp’s definitions for each relation,
our contrastive contexts all involve a CORRECTION relation
between the discourse segment of Speaker A and B—i.e., a piece
of information in A is rejected by B, thus the propositions
associated with the two segments cannot be simultaneously true.
Therefore, although it would be tempting to try and explain
our data in terms of differing discourse relations, our stimuli
all stand in one and the same relation of correction. It would
also be reasonable to cast an explanation of our data in terms of
clefts being inherently corrective rather than inherently contrary.
Put slightly differently, our notion of contrariness could be seen
as an implementation of the notion of corrective focus: see
e.g., Gussenhoven (2008). However, even though our analysis is
inspired by correctivity accounts as well as by Zimmermann’s,
three differences are worth noting. First and most importantly,
we take contrariness to be a matter of degree, which is not how
corrections are normally analyzed. Indeed, existing accounts of
correctivity do not incorporate any notion of degree, whereby
one correction is in some sense stronger than another. In
Repp’s account, for example, the correction relation either holds
between discourse segments or fails to hold, with no in between.
The degree of contrast is encoded across relations, not within
one. In our experiment, we varied the degree of contrast within
the relation of correction. Therefore we can say that extant
models of correctivity could not account for our data, and such
models would have to be augmented in some way that would
allow corrections of weakly held beliefs to be differentiated from
corrections of strongly held beliefs.
Second, it seems plausible to have instances of contrariness
where the claim runs counter to expectation but there has been
no explicit counter claim to correct. Consider the example in
(15). To deal with this example in a correction-based theory
would require some modification to allow for the possibility of
correcting things that have not actually been said, for instance
by accommodation. Although, we do not dispute that such
accommodation will sometimes be needed, we believe this is
stretching the notion of correction unreasonably. Moreover,
to make it work in Repp’s account, which is a discourse-
relation based account, one would need accommodation of a
contrary utterance. Because our contrariness account is based
not on differences between what has been said, but on the
difference between beliefs, to account for cases like (15), we
require a different type of modification, namely accommodation
of contrary belief. We recognize however, that this is a quite
subtle difference between Repp’s corrective account and our
contrariness account; a difference as to whether they focus on
what is believed vs. what is said, and that it might be hard to find
examples that truly distinguish between the two.
(15) A: Who won the NBA dunk contest this year?
B: No way you’ll believe this, but it just so happens that
it was an unknown contender from Iowa called Louis D.
Johnson whomanaged to get the most points, and on the
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final dunk!
A: No fucking way!
B: Yes fucking way - you should have seen her alley-
oop windmill off the back of a donkey? Johnson
is incredible!!!
Third, Prince’s informative clefts are a problem for corrective
analyses. Consider for instance example (16):
(16) It was at the University of Iowa that Camille D. Johnson
first managed to apply her deep knowledge of clefts in
natural language to the world of particle physics, and, for
the first time in human history, to split the atom entirely
by the use of carefully targeted questions.
While there is no prior material being corrected here, it is not
implausible that, in such cases, the claim is being presented
for rhetorical effect as running counter to an expectation. Here
again though, it is implausible that we could accommodate
that someone had said something contrary to this, but it is
quite plausible that we could accommodate a contrary belief or
expectation8.
Finally, our findings can be considered in the broader light
of prior work on the function of prosody and other ways of
marking information status. Much prior work on focus has
emphasized properties that relate to the presence of some prior
structure in discourse, for example the presence of a question,
of an element of the same type as the target, or of a clause
which exhibits structural parallelism. A different line of work was
initiated by Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg (1990), who analyze
various types of intonational contour in terms of speaker and
8We contend that to date, no theory that requires an explicit discourse antecedent
can account for informative clefts without some additional mechanism of
accommodation. However, in augmenting the theory in this way, corrective
analyses face a conceptual problem which is absent from the contrariness analysis.
The term correction is standardly used in linguistics to refer to a speech act used
to correct another speech act, or to a rhetorical relation holding between pairs of
speech acts. To the extent that our contrariness proposal assumes anaphoricity of
the cleft to a discourse antecedent, it faces the same problem. However, the central
notion of our contrariness proposal is not disagreement with a speech act, but
disagreement with an attitude. To be clearer, there are two distinct requirements
in the contrariness theory. If Repp or some other supporter of a correction-based
account was to understand the notion of correction more liberally, such that it
could include correction of implicit assumptions, then indeed this data would not
divide between correction and contrariness accounts. In that case, data like (16)
is showing what sort of correction-based account is needed, rather than showing
that the notion of correction should be entirely dispensed with. Yet, we believe
examples such as (i) might distinguish between the two proposals.
(i) Emilie (looking disappointed in David): You ate the rest of my cake, didn’t
you?
David (wiping crumbs from mouth and looking guilty): Uhhh, ooops.
Yeah, ok, itWASme who ate it, but I thought you were done, and it looked
way too good to waste!
In this type of case, there is clearly no correction since the speaker is agreeing with
the suggestion from the speaker’s slightly biased question. There is contrariness
however, but it is contrariness to norms or expectations about proper behavior,
not contrariness with respect to what Emilie said or believed at utterance time.
Therefore, our idea is that contrariness is a much more natural notion than
correction here. One does not “correct” norms or expectations by showing a
counter-instance.
hearer expectations. Our experiments and analysis imply that
clefts have an intrinsically doxastic function. While the specific
results we have obtained are not predicted by any prior model,
they do suggest that the Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg approach
is on right track for analyzing the marking of information status
more generally.
Indeed, they are also in line with work suggesting thatmarking
of speaker expectation is a central function of language, markers
of such expectations sometimes being brought together in a
(controversial) category of miratives (DeLancey, 1997). It is
notable that several focus sensitive constructions have been taken
to be mirative, including scalar additives like English even /
Frenchmême and exclusives like English only / French seulement
(see e.g., Beaver and Clark, 2009). Recently, Cruschina (2012)
discusses the relationship between contrast and focus fronting
(i.e., movement of the focus constituent to the left-periphery
of the sentence), arguing that different subtypes of focus are
relevant for the realization and interpretation of this syntactic
movement. For instance, the author shows that while most
Romance languages employ focus fronting as a strategy to signal
the most explicit case of contrast, namely correction, they also
resort to this strategy to encode mirative focus, that is new
information that is particularly surprising or unexpected to the
hearer. In the same vein, Trotzke (2017) provides empirical
evidence for German. Results from an acceptability judgment
task suggest that focus fronting in this language is also more
commonly associated with a mirative interpretation rather than
either a corrective or a contrastive interpretation. Finally, Bianchi
et al. (2016) find that the intonational patterns associated with
fronted constituents in the mirative condition differs from those
found in the correction condition, thus positing that mirative
focus is indeed grammatically distinct from corrective focus. The
authors go on discussing the nature (or status) of this mirative
interpretative effect, analyzing it as a conventional implicature
(in the sense of Potts, 2005). Going back to the construction
of interest in this paper, the fact that clefts, which help mark
focus, turn out to have a function related to speaker expectation
is of a piece with the fact that some focus sensitive constructions
have previously been identified as mirative. Although we are
not currently in a position to make any strong claims about the
nature of the contrariness requirement we posit for clefts, we
acknowledge that the analysis proposed by Bianchi et al. (2016)
for the mirative effects associated with focus fronting might be
extendable to clefts. Given the amount of work on the nature
of exhaustivity in clefts, which is analyzed as an implicature by
some (see e.g., Horn, 1981; Destruel, 2013), one line of research
worth pursuing would be to directly compare the strength of
the contrariness effect with the effects of classic inferences failing
such as exhaustivity.
While our data answers the main questions we set out with, it
is also suggestive of new questions. First, we might ask whether
the judgment effects we have observed would be mirrored
in usage data, e.g., in terms of the frequencies of canonical
sentences and cleft sentences in more or less contrary contexts.
Indeed, although rating scales tend to provide stable, replicable
and transparent pieces of data (Tonhauser and Matthewson,
unpublished manuscript), one limitation concerns the possible
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variation in participants’ interpretation of the provided Likert
scale, and therefore their resulting use of the scale to provide
their judgments. In the present studies, we chose to label each
point on the Likert scale rather than only the two end points in
order to limit variation as much as possible. Another potential
limitation concerns the fact that the language data we are
examining involve quite subtle judgments, which might explain
the gradience we observe in our results. Given these potential
limitations, a corpus investigation would be a welcome addition
but such an investigation is not necessarily straightforward and
easy to implement, as it would require the operationalization of
the notion of contrariness in naturally occurring data. This would
certainly be a challenge with a purely automatic methodology
for identifying examples in corpora, but perhaps is not beyond
what might be achieved using a combination of computational
methods for retrieving naturally occurring clefts in context, and
human annotation for assessing the degree of contrariness (or,
for that matter, correctivity, if this could be assessed as a matter
of degree).
Second, for those who accept the premise that gradient
data of the sort we see in this experiment is suggestive of
a pragmatic rather than a semantic account, what would be
the underlying pragmatic explanation? That is, how might one
derive from standard assumptions about the meaning of clefts
and standard pragmatic principles the fact that clefts are more
felicitous as contrariness increases? Finally, given that we have
established that in some way clefts are used to mark differences
in expectation, how might they be fitted into a more general
theory of mirativity, i.e., of how expectation is signaled in
human language?
4. CONCLUSIONS
The goal of the present paper was to test prior hypotheses
concerning clefts’ standard components of meaning. We
hypothesized that the mere presence of an antecedent in
discourse which the clefted element would pick up and comment
on (i.e., simple contrast) would not suffice to fully explain
the felicity pattern of English it-clefts. Instead, we set out to
test the hypothesis that something more refined is needed,
namely a notion of contrast that includes a conflict between
interlocutors’ expectations. We adapted Zimmermann’s notion
of contrast, which relates to how strongly the addressee believes
the contrary, and experimentally operationalized it. Our data
suggests that contrariness does indeed play an important role
in helping speakers choose between cleft and canonical forms:
the more strongly an interlocutor appears committed to a false
proposition, the better it is to repudiate them with a cleft as
opposed to using canonical word order, and this effect is visible
over and above other factors that distinguish the distribution of
clefts in French and English.
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